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CASE DIGEST

This CASE DIGEST provides brief analyses of cases that represent current aspects of transnational law. The Digest includes cases that establish legal principles and cases that apply established legal principles to
new factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories, and
references are given for further research.
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I. ALIENS AND CITIZENSHIP
CONSTITUTIONALITY
AMENDMENTS

OF

THE

UPHELD OVER

IMMIGRATION

CHALLENGE

MARRIAGE

FRAUD

BY DEPORTABLE ALIEN

SPoUSE-Anetekhai v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 876 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1989).
AND UNITED STATES

In 1986 the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) discovered
that Paul Anetekhai, an alien who had entered the United States on a
nonimmigrant student visa, was employed without authorization. The
INS commenced deportation proceedings against him. In January 1987
Anetekhai married a United States citizen. Believing that his marriage to
a United States citizen would make the deportation proceedings unnecessary, Anetekhai moved to dismiss the proceedings. The immigration
judge denied the motion and found Anetekhai deportable.
The Anetekhais subsequently brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. The couple claimed that section 5(b) of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments (IMFA), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(h) (1986),
which imposes a two-year nonresidency requirement for aliens who
marry United States citizens while subject to deportation proceedings,
was unconstitutional. The couple argued that section 5(b) violated the
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couple's rights to equal protection and due process under the fourteenth
amendment as well as their first amendment rights to privacy and association. The Anetekais also asserted that section 5(b) violated the ninth
and tenth amendments by purporting to regulate Louisiana marriages.
The district court dismissed the complaint and entered judgment in favor
of the INS, holding that section 5(b) was constitutional and that imposing such a requirement was within Congress plenary power.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Held: Affirmed. The court found
that Congress had enacted the IMFA to ferret out sham marriages entered into by aliens for the purpose of avoiding deportation. Through
marriage to United States citizens, these aliens seek to qualify for "immediate relative" status, which would exempt them from statutorily imposed immigration quotas under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (1982). The court held that the IMFA does not violate
the equal protection or due process rights of aliens because Congress had
a legitimate interest in deterring fraudulent marriages and could rationally have concluded that the statute would reduce marriage fraud. The
court stated that the process due Anetekhai was limited to fair procedures to determine whether the statute was properly invoked and that
the statute did not unconstitutionally purport to regulate state marriages.
Significance-In this decision, the court defers to Congress broad discretion in the area of immigration and upholds the constitutionality of section 5(b) of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments, which imposes special requirements on an alien in the process of being deported
even though the alien is married to a United States citizen.
II.
STANDING

GRANTED

ANTITRUST

TO CHALLENGE

HOSTILE

TAKEOVER

BE-

TWEEN FOREIGN FIRMS UNDER UNITED STATES ANTITRUST AND SE-

LAWS-Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871
F.2d 252 (2nd Cir. 1989).
CURITIES

Consolidated Gold Fields PLC (Gold Fields), a British corporation
with $2.4 billion in assets, half of which were located in the United
States, was the target of a hostile tender offer by Minorco, S.A. (Minorco), a Luxembourg corporation with a 29.9% interest in Gold Fields.
United States held 2.5% of the outstanding shares of Gold Fields. Gold
Fields and three entities under its control sought a preliminary injunction under sections 16 and 7 of the Clayton Act against the takeover in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the tender offer violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by making false and mis-
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leading statements about the extent to which Minorco was controlled by
South African corporations and individuals.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction, which prevented
Minorco, along with co-defendants Anglo American Corporation of
South Africa, Ltd. and De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. from proceeding with the tender offer. The district court found that two of the
plaintiffs, Newmont Mining Corporation, a United States corporation in
which Gold Fields held a 49.3% stake, and its subsidiary, Newmont
Gold Company, had proved a likelihood of success on their claim that
the takeover of Gold Fields would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The court, however, refused to grant standing to Gold Fields and its
wholly-owned United States subsidiary, Gold Fields Mining Corporation (GFMC). In addition, the district court dismissed the claim of securities fraud for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Soon after the district court granted the preliminary injunction, the
British Secretary of State for Trade and Industry referred the Minorco
bid to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) for investigation of the acquisition's potential anticompetitive effect in the United
Kingdom with respect to strategic metals. British law prohibited Minorco from proceeding with the tender offer during the MMC's investigation. The MMC concluded that the acquisition would not operate
against the British public interest, but Minorco stated that it would not
purchase shares pursuant to a tender offer unless the injunction issued
by the United States District Court was vacated or modified.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Held: Affirmed in Part,
Reversed in Part and Remanded. The court affirmed the lower court's
grant of a preliminary injunction for relief, finding that the plaintiffs
had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim
under sections 7 and 16 of the Clayton Act. The court reversed the district court's denial of standing to Gold Fields and GFMC, holding that
they had demonstrated a threat of antitrust injury. The court stated that
the acquisition would eliminate Gold Fields' ability to compete independently in the gold production market and that GFMC would be
threatened with a curtailment of its production. The court also held that
the four plaintiffs had demonstrated a threat of irreparable harm because
because the merger was likely to enable the Minorco group to dominate
the strategically important world gold market and Gold Fields & its associated entities would cease to be viable competitors in the market.
The court concluded that the district court should have asserted subject matter jurisdiction over the fraud claims. According to the court, the
tender offer had sufficient effects within the United States to warrant the
application of United States securities laws. The Securities and Ex-
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change Commission supported subject matter jurisdiction over the fraud
claims but urged the court to direct the district court to abstain from
granting a remedy for reasons of international comity. The court declined this suggestion, however, and remanded the fraud claims to the
district court for further proceedings to determine whether an appropriate remedy consistent with international comity principles could be fashioned. Significance-In a case involving a tender offer between two foreign corporations and occurring on foreign soil when only a small
percentage of the target's shareholders were United States residents, the
court granted standing to a target company to challenge a hostile takeover under United States antitrust laws and allowed an assertion of subject matter jurisdiction over a claim of securities fraud.

III.

TRADEMARK

LANHAM ACT BARS IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN FIRMS'

GOODS

WHICH ARE DIFFERENT PHYSICALLY FROM THE GOODS OF UNITED

STATES AFFILIATE, BUT HAVE IDENTICAL TRADEMARKS-LEVER
BROTHERS Co. V. U.S., 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

Lever Brothers Company (Lever US), a domestic corporation, sought
a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to direct the United States Customs Service to exclude
a third party's importation of goods manufactured by a foreign affiliate
of the plaintiff under the same trademark as some of the parent's goods.
Lever US and Lever Brothers Ltd. (Lever UK), an English corporation,
were affiliates using the same words, "Shield" and "Sunlight," as trademarks for products differing materially in the two countries. Third parties directly or indirectly acquired the UK Shield and Sunlight products
and imported them to the United States over the objection of Lever US.
Despite requests by Lever US, the Customs Service would not halt the
impoftation because the trademarks were used abroad by an affiliate of
Lever US. Lever US claimed that Customs was bound to seize such imports because section 42 of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982), provides that no imported merchandise which copies or simulates a registered trademark shall be admitted
by Customs. Lever US contended that where affiliated domestic and foreign firms produce goods which bear the same trademark but differ in
physical content, the foreign products simulate the domestic trademark so
that section 42 forbids their importation, notwithstanding the fact of
affiliation.
The Customs Service argued that the regulation calling for the seizure
of foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical with one owned
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and recorded by a United States corporation, 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)
(1988), includes an exception for affiliates. According to Customs, based
on the affiliate exception, goods are genuine and do not simulate a domestic trademarked good when they bear trademarks valid in their country of origin and when the foreign manufacturer is affiliated with the
domestic trademark holder.
The district court agreed with the interpretation of section 42 asserted
by Customs, and Lever US appealed. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Held: Reversed and Remanded. The court held that:
(1) section 42 of the Lanham Act bars foreign goods which bear a trademark identical to a valid United States trademark but which differ physically, regardless of the trademarks' genuine character abroad or the affiliation between the producing firms; but (2) the conclusion was
provisional since neither party had briefed the legislative history or administrative practice in detail. The court found that the Customs Service
relied heavily on "gray market" cases, in which a United States trademark holder and a third party import goods that are physically identical
and manufactured by the same foreign firms. The court pointed out,
however, that when goods bearing a valid foreign trademark are physically different from United States trademarked goods, courts have been
willing to find infringement.
According to the court, a trademark holder cannot infringe its own
mark. The court reasoned that to the extent the affiliate exception contained in 19 C.F.R. 133.21(c)(2) extends this principle to goods imported
into the United States by companies affiliated with the United States
markholder it is unobjectionable. However, the court found it implausible that the affiliation exception should extend to imports by third parties. Significance-In this decision, the court provisionally extended the
scope of section 42 of the Lanham Act to limit third party importation of
foreign goods that bear a trademark identical to a valid United States
trademark but which are physically different from the United States
product regardless of affiliation between the producing firms.
IV.

AIR CARRIER LIABILITY

WARSAW CONVENTION'S LIMITATION ON AIR CARRIER LIABILITY
NOT ELIMINATED BY FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF

LIMITATION IN PASSENGER TICKETS-Chan

v. Korean Air Lines,

Ltd., 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989).
The petitioners brought actions in several federal district courts for the
wrongful death of passengers of a Korean Air Lines, Ltd. (KAL) airliner shot down by the Soviet Union over the Sea of Japan. The actions
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were transferred to the District Court for the District of Columbia. The
rights of the parties were governed by the Warsaw Convention, a multilateral treaty governing international air travel. The Convention fixed a
per passenger damage limitation for personal injury or death at 8,300
dollars. The Montreal Agreement raised this limit to 75,000 dollars in
1966. The Montreal Agreement also required carriers to give passengers
notice of the Convention's damage limitations in print size no smaller
than 10-point type print. By motion of partial summary judgment, the
petitioners sought a declaration that since the notice of the Convention's
liability rules in KAL's tickets appeared in 8-point type, KAL should be
deprived of the benefits of the damages limitation.
The District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion
and held that neither the Warsaw Convention nor the Montreal Agreement prescribes the elimination of the damages limitation when the required form of notice is not provided. In its opinion, the district court
rejected contrary Second Circuit precedent. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.
The Supreme Court Held: Affirmed. Justice Scalia, writing for five
members of the Court, stated that international air carriers do not lose
the benefits of the Warsaw Convention damages limitation if they fail to
provide notice of that limitation in passenger tickets. According to the
Court, the Montreal Agreement imposes no sanction for failure to comply with its 10-point type requirements. The Court stated that the plain
language of Article 3(2) of the Warsaw Convention subjects the carrier
to unlimited liability for the nondelivery of a passenger ticket. The Court
held, however, that this language could not be construed to include failure to provide an "adequate" notice of a damages limitation as the petitioners had argued, since Article 3(2) specifies that the irregularity of the
ticket will not affect the existence or validity of the transportation
contract.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens
concurred in the judgment. However, Justice Brennan pointed out that
the petitioners' argument had been accepted by virtually every United
States court that had considered it and had been consistently adopted by
the executive branch. Therefore, the Court should have considered the
Convention's drafting history as well as its language. Significance-The
Court resolved a conflict among the courts of appeals and adopted the
minority position that the failure of international air carrier tickets to
provide an adequate notice of liability limitation does not eliminate the
benefit of the damages limitation in the Warsaw Convention.

